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complex litigation and proposed a reasonable method for resolving
those issues. The Supreme Court should settle the controversy sur-
rounding the availability of jury trials in complex litigation by examin-
ing and endorsing the Third Circuit's rationale and result.
ANTITRUST LAW-LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONS-PHYSICIANS'
AGREEMENTS TO SET MAXIMUM FEES IN FOUNDATIONS FOR MEDICAL
CARE ARE NOT PER SE VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT. Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, [1980-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,239
(9th Cir.). The State of Arizona brought an antitrust action in federal
district court against two foundations for medical care (FMCs)' and a
county medical society, alleging that the groups established fixed medi-
cal fees in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Arizona sought
to enjoin the FMC physicians from setting maximum prices for their
medical services. On a motion for summary judgment, the state argued
that price-fixing agreements among competitors are per se3 illegal. The
district court, denying the motion,4 ruled that the agreements were not
price-fixing per se, and that rule of reason5 analysis should determine
the legality of the agreement. On appeal6 the court affirmed, and held:
Agreements among FMC physicians setting maximum prices for fees
are not per se price-fixing arrangements, and a rule of reason-analysis
1. FMCs are associations of physicians in traditional private practices. The associations are
sponsored by county medical societies. FMCs have two basic purposes: (I) To provide prepaid
health services to consumers, and (2) to control health care costs and improve the quality of medi-
cal services through peer review. FMCs approve and administer insurance plans underwritten by
private insurance companies. Physicians directly bill the third-party insurer for the individual
medical services provided to patient-policyholders.
One way that FMC physicians control costs is by collectively agreeing to set maximum prices
that they will charge to FMC insurance plans for services. Price ceilings are periodically set by
majority vote. FMCs also cut medical costs through review systems that weed out unnecessary
medical procedures and hospital visits. See generally C. STEINWALD, AN INTtRODUCrION TO
FOUNDATIONS FOR MEDICAL CAtE (1971); Egdahl, Foundationsfor Medical Care, 288 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 491 (1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) in pertinent part provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... "
3. See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
4. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, [1979-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,694 (D.
Ariz.), interlocutory appeal ajt'd, [1980-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,239 (9th Cir.).
5. See notes 10-12 infra and accompanying text.
6. Appeal was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 41 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST 1067
consistently unreasonable. Application of the protracted economic
analysis required by the rule of reason is judicially wasteful. The per se
rule avoids unnecessary analysis by declaring certain categories of con-
duct "intrinsically unreasonable."' 3  Once a court determines that a
challenged practice falls within a per se category, the court will not
entertain justifications for the conduct. 14
The Supreme Court has established several categories of per se ille-
gal conduct under the Sherman Act. 5 One per se category is price-
fixing-any horizontal or vertical agreement among competitors with
the purpose or effect of setting prices.1 6 Both minimum 7 and maxi-
mum price-fixing arrangements are included within this ban.'8
13. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). Mr. Justice H. Black
penned the classic definition of the per se rule in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958):
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of perse unreasonableness not
only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain
to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a partic-
ular restraint has been unreasonable--an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when under-
taken.
14 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940). See generally
Bork (pt. I), supra note 9, at 783-811.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market divisions per se
illegal); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts per se
illegal); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements per se illegal).
16. See United States v. Soony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the
Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose of and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity. . . is illegal per se.").
While the force of this broad holding is unquestioned, there is a minority line of cases that
approve trade restraints under the rule of reason that appear to be per se illegal price-fixing activi-
ties. See. e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). For a discussion of the importance of these decisions,
see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST LAW 68 (1977) (cases are aberrant and do not reflect
modern law); Bork, (pt. I), supra note 9, at 777 (cases reflect "divergent lines of authority which
the courts have never satisfactorily reconciled").
17. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
18. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (efforts by newspaper publisher to coerce
distributor to adopt vertical maximum resale price agreement is per se illegal); Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (agreement between affiliated manufacturers to
set maximum resale prices for wholesalers is per se illegal).
Kiefer-Stewart does not explicitly hold that horizontal agreements setting maximum prices are
per se illegal because the two conspiring manufacturers were owned by the same company. The
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/16
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Recently, however, the Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS 19 cau-
tioned against artificial application of per se analysis to price-fixing. In
Broadcast Music owners of copyrighted music issued blanket licenses
for performance of their works. Licensees, mostly radio and television
stations, paid a set fee for the right to use an entire collection of music.
Overturning the lower court finding of per se price-fixing, the Court
noted that price-fixing is a term of art, describing conduct that ad-
versely affects competition. The Court argued that every agreement
that fixes prices does not necessarily suppress competition.20 The ma-
jority believed that courts should not automatically label unique ar-
rangements, previously unexamined by the courts, as per se price-fixing
unless the agreements clearly produce a prohibited effect on competi-
tion.2' In this instance, the Court found that the arrangement might be
valid under a rule of reason analysis because the arrangement was the
only economically feasible method for licensing the use of the music. 22
case, however, does not make sense unless the Court assumed the manufacturers independently
determined prices. See Bork (pt. II), supra note 8, at 464. Because of the sweeping prohibition
fashioned in the Kiefer case, it is generally agreed that horizontal agreements are banned as per se
price-fixing. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 210.
In prohibiting maximum price agreements the Aibrecht Court reasoned that maximum prices
would interfere with a seller's freedom to set a competitive price, and would inevitably cause the
maximum price to become the uniform minimum price in an industry. The Aibrecht Court found
that businesses might limit prices to levels sufficiently low to prohibit market entry by new com-
petitors. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
Some commentators have attacked the Kiefer and Albrecht decisions because the per se bans
invoked were not the usual "culmination of a long series of rulings establishing that the chal-
lenged practice. . . [could] rarely, if ever, be justified and that the usual evidentiary inquiry into
purpose, power and effect would be wasteful." Kalstrom, Health Care Costs by Third Party
Payors Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 666-67.
19. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(location restrictions by manufacturer on sale of goods in franchise agreements, previously per se
illegal, are to be analyzed under the rule of reason).
20. 441 U.S. at 9.
21. Id
22. Individual licenses between the myriad of copyright owners and stations were cost pro-
hibitive, and the blanket license evolved as a response to this problem. The licenses were, accord-
ing to the Court, a market necessity. Id at 20. The Court also pointed out that these nonexclusive
licenses did not prohibit individual owners and stations from negotiating their own license price;
thus, under the rule of reason, the practice might not be anticompetitive. Id at 24.
The Court found that the blanket license could be considered an ancillary restraint on competi-
tion. See 91 HARv. L. REv. 448 (1977). See also Kallstrom, supra note 18, at 656. Ancillary
restraints are combinations or integrations by competitors that result in overall economic elticien-
cies and thus are procompetitive under a rule of reason analysis. Price-fixing is banned because it
generally constrains market price without producing a desirable economic effect. Bork (pt. II),
supra note 8, at 386. Certain joint venture agreements involving price stabilization among com-
[Vol. 58:1055
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The normal rules of antitrust analysis, however, do not wholly apply
to the "learned professions."23 Courts historically distinguished profes-
sional services from normal profit-oriented "trade or commerce," and
thus held professions beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.24 Recog-
nizing that professions served the public welfare, courts believed that
self-imposed restraints on competition benefited the public by regulat-
ing ethical behavior and insuring quality standards of service. Later,
courts began to apply the Sherman Act to certain professional activi-
ties, realizing that many professional restraints serve only the commer-
cial interests of the members of the profession.
26
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar2 7 the Supreme Court explicitly re-
petitors are condoned under the ancillary restraint doctrine. 91 HARV. L. REV. 488, 491 n.24
(1977).
23. The learned professions include medicine, law, engineering, etc. The distinction in
American law between the "trade and commerce" of the business world and the conduct of the
"learned professions" was first mentioned by Mr. Justice Story in The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506
(C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388).
24. The United States Supreme Court never expressly exempted the professions from anti-
trust legislation. The Court specifically refused to decide the issue in AMA v. United States, 317
U.S. 519, 528 (1943). However, dictum in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S.
200, 209 (1922) ("[A] firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case... does not engage in
.. commerce.") and FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) ("They [doctors] follow a
profession and not a trade ... ") led lower federal courts to create an exemption for the profes-
sions. See, e.g., Rigall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 954 (1958); United States v. AMA, 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 599 (1939). See generally Bauer, Profes-
sional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1975).
25. See, e.g., Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963). Courts are sensitive to the
distinctions between normal businesses and the health professions:
We might observe in passing, however, that there are ethical considerations where the
historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are quite
different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This
Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world may be de-
moralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.
United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
26. Many courts distinguish between noncommercial, public service purposes (e.g., standards
of care, ethical behavior) and commercial, income-generating purposes when deciding whether a
professional activity constituted "trade or commerce" under the Sherman Act. Professional activi-
ties of a commercial nature were included within the Sherman Act's jurisdiction. Compare
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (college accreditation a noncommercial
activity) with Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962) (price-fixing by pharmaceutical organization a commercial activity
within the scope of the Sherman Act). See generally 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRusT LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION § 49.02[l][b][ii1 (1980).
27. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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jected a blanket learned profession exemption from the Sherman Act.28
In Goldfarb the Court ruled that a county and state bar association
committed a per se violation of the Act by establishing minimum legal
fees for title examinations.29 Although the Court recognized the impor-
tant public service function of professions, it concluded that professions
generated income and therefore were commercial enterprises.30  The
Court, however, cautioned against equating professional and business
restraints under antitrust law. Public service considerations and other
features of the professions distinguish restraints imposed by profes-
sional groups from those imposed by business entities. The Court
deemed the rule of reason the appropriate means for weighing profes-
sional considerations against anticompetitive effects, but failed to state
explicitly when rule of reason analysis should replace traditional per se
review for professional associations.32
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States33 the
Supreme Court again applied a per se analysis to declare a professional
ban on competitive bidding illegal.34 The Court reaffirmed the Gold-
28. Id. at 786-87.
29. "[H]ere a nakedagreement was clearly shown, and the effect on prices plain." 421 U.S. at
782 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The commentators are in general agreement that Gold.
farb employs the per se rule. See Branca& Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and LegalAdvert/s.
ing: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 475, 507 (1977); Comment, Antitrust-
Professions-Per Se Rule Appliedto Ethical Canon Against Competitive Bidding, 62 MARQ. L. REV.
260, 265 (1978); Note, supra note 12, at 399 n.36; Comment, Sherman Act Scrutiny ofBar Re-
straints on Advertising and Solicitation by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1143-44 (1976); Com-
ment, Antitrust Law: Minimum Fee Schedules Violate the Sherman Act, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 485,
487 n.29 (1976). But see Price-Fixing, Advertising Bans, and Other Self-Regulation by Attorneys.
What Future Under the Antitrust Laws?, 12 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 531, 538-40 (1976).
30. See 421 U.S. at 788.
31. The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
man Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions anti-trust
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate
no view on any other situation than the onewith which we are confronted today.
Id. at 788 n.17.
32. See Note, Antitrust-Professions-Per Se Rule Applied to Ethical Canon Against Compet-
tive Bidding, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 260, 265 (1978).
33. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
34. Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, defined as per se illegal those "agroements
whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish illegality." Id at 692 (emphasis added). He then characterized the
competitive bidding ban at issue in the case: "While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate
Washington University Open Scholarship
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farb distinction between professions and business, and stated that the
rule of reason should be applied in accounting for this distinction."
The Court mentioned the enforcement of "ethical norms" as the type of
professional conduct that might be upheld under the rule of reason, 36
but failed to provide guidance as to when rule of reason analysis should
replace per se analysis in examinations of professional industries.
Several lower courts interpreted Goldfarb to require application of
the per se rule to commercial professional restraints, while requiring
application of the rule of reason to arrangements motivated by non-
commercial concerns.37 Other lower courts also have extended the
analysis of Goldfarb and Professional Engineers to prepaid professional
insurance plans. At least one court held that an alleged group profes-
sional boycott, normally per se illegal, should be scrutinized under the
rule of reason.38
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive effect of such an agreement ...
On itsface, this agreement restrains trade within the meaning of § I of the Sherman Act." Id at
692-93 (emphasis added). But cf Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 12, at 323 (Professional Engineers
utilizes abbreviated rule of reason analysis because anticompetitive effect easily recognized).
35. 435 U.S. at 696.
36. Id
37. See Viezaga v. National Bd. of Respiratory Therapy, [1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274
(N.D. Ill.). Cf Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D.
Fla. 1976). aff'd in part and rev'din part, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 444 U.S. 924
(1979) (district court constructs rule that prima facie presumption of per se illegality exists when
doctors' activity involves commercial purpose; physicians then have the burden of proving that the
actions were motivated by a valid medical concern). But cf Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) (utilize rule of reason to decide
antitrust cases involving professional activities).
Many noncommercial professional activities deserve scrutiny under antitrust law to weigh their
competitive impact. The rule of reason is the proper analytical tool. For example, certification of
practitioners and scholastic accreditation restrict the number of professionals and thus may inflate
the price of professional fees. Yet professionals defend these practices as necessary to insure qual-
ity care to the public. See Horan & Nord, Application of.Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery
System, 9 Cum. L. REV. 685, 705 (1979).
38. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980) (under rule of reason, Blue Shield violated Sherman Act by refusing to reimburse psy-
chologists for their services unless they billed through physician).
Prior to Goldfarb, one prepaid drug insurance plan was banned as per se illegal, in part because
pharmacists conspired with the state Blue Shield to implement uniform prices. See Blue Cross v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970). A United States Justice Department spokes-
man has stated that the Department will regard as per se price-fixing any drug plan in which
pharmacists collectively establish fees. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Aspects of
Prepaid Subscription Plans (mimeograph), quoted in Oppenaheim, Antitrust Policy and Third-Party
Prepaid Prescription Drug Plans, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 244, 260-62 (1971). Advisory guidelines,
however, are not binding on any court. When maximum prices are established by independent
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/16
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In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society the court of appeals
held that the uniqueness of both the medical fee arrangement and the
characteristics of the medical profession required a rule of reason anal-
ysis. 39 The court reasoned that although the agreements appeared to
fix prices, branding the agreements per se illegal would ignore their
potentially beneficial effects and their potential for reduction of con-
sumer medical costs. 40
The court found that the naturally monopolistic nature of the health
professions and governmental subvention of medical costs caused the
health care industry to possess inherently anticompetitive characteris-
tics. Because a per se rule would superficially analogize the health in-
dustry to the normal supply and demand market, the rule of reason
provided an appropriate method of scrutinizing the economic impact of
health care price-fixing agreements. 4' The court cited Professional En-
gineers to support the application of the rule of reason to the learned
professions.42
The dissent argued that maximum price-fixing arrangements are per
se illegal under the Sherman Act. Neither the health professions, nor
professions generally, warrant exemption from the per se rule.43 The
dissent interpreted Goldfarb and Professional Engineers as requiring
application of the per se rule to this price-fixing agreement because the
fee arrangement was wholly commercial and unrelated to any uniquely
professional goals.' The dissent concluded that no further analysis
insurance companies, the threat of market-wide uniform prices may be diminished because indi-
vidual companies compete with each other for lower fees to gain a greater share of the prepaid
insurance market. Maximum prices unilaterally set by insurance companies may be legal ancil-
lary restraints because they allow companies to accurately formulate premium costs, and thus
promote financially sound prepaid insurance plans. See Kallstrom, supra note 18, at 670-73.
The ABA issued similar price-fixing warnings for prepaid legal services in which lawyers or bar
associations collectively establish fees. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES,
COMPILATION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES at i (1973). See also
Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Prepaid Legal Service Plans, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
855, 874-82.
39. The court believed that closer scrutiny of the FMC agreements was necessary to weigh
their overall impact on the entire medical insurance market. [1980-I] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,239,
at 78, 154-56 (9th Cir.).
40. Id at 78,155. The court noted that physicians might effectively control costs for fear of
government regulation of fees.
41. Id at 78,154-55.
42. Id at 78,157.
43. Id at 78,160-61.
44. Id at 78,161-62 (Larson, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 58:1055
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was necessary to find illegality under the Act.
The.Maricopa decision supports the rule fashioned in Broadcast Mu-
sic. When the competitive effects of arrangements, such as the FMC
agreements, are unknown, use of the price-fixing label does not permit
the comprehensive analysis allowed under the rule of reason. While
the Sherman Act prohibits maximum price-fixing, the FMC arrange-
ment is distinguishable from other price-fixing agreements. The FMC
agreement is an ancillary restraint to a valid economic purpose.45 Max-
imum price controls in the prepaid health insurance field are ancillary
restraints that allocate and reduce the cost of medical services. 46 It is,
however, arguable that competition within the medical profession will
be adversely affected if doctors, as opposed to independent insurance
companies, set prices.47 A court should apply a rule of reason analysis
to maximum price-fixing schedules, which a health care industry has
drafted.
While the Maricopa court correctly applied a rule of reason analysis,
the court's reliance on Professional Engineers expands the learned pro-
fession exemption beyond the holding of Professional Engineers. The
court in Maricopa relied on Professional Engineers to support applica-
tion of the rule of reason to the learned professions. Both Goldfarb
and Professional Engineers, however, mandate rule of reason analysis
when conduct within a learned profession relates to a legitimate profes-
sional concern. When agreements within the learned professions regu-
late commercial concerns, the rationale for shielding professions from
per se analysis evaporates.48
Because the FMC agreement in Maricopa did not regulate a pecu-
liarly professional concern, the court's application of the professional
exemption was incorrect. By misreading Professional Engineers the
court held that rule of reason analysis is applicable to conduct within
the learned professions even when the conduct relates solely to com-
mercial goals.
The Maricopa decision reaffirms the appropriateness of applying a
45. See note 22 supra.
46. Price controls are preferred by insurance companies because they allow accurate formu-
lation of costs and premiums. Price ceilings also may help physicians to control soaring medical
costs. See note 38 supra. See also Meeks, supra note 38, at 883.
47. See, e.g., Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing,
1978 DuKE L.J. 303, 377; Kallstrom, supra note 18, at 661-62.
48. See Note, supra note 12, at 396-416.
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rule of reason analysis to practices that, although resembling per se ille-
gal conduct, arguably promote an equitable allocation of costs and
services. The Maricopa court's exemption of the health care industry
from per se scrutiny should be limited to agreements that pertain to
noncommercial activities of the medical profession.
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